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SHIPPING CONFERENCE DUAL-RATE CONTRACT
ARRANGEMENTS AS A COMPETITIVE WEAPON
JON MAGNUSSON t
L ITIGATION pitting the predecessor agencies of the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission against the Department of
Justice has been, for many years, the deplorable fare for
lawyers engaged in the regulation of the ocean shipping
industry. The intellectual raw material of the disputant
federal agencies may provide grist for the slow, fine-grinding
mills of bureaucracy with a by-product of rich, controversy-
centered news, but the end products of this milling operation
have only been expense, delay and uncertainty for the
regulated shipping lines.
The attack in the courts has been aimed at achieving
pre-eminence of a congressional anti-trust policy over an
explicit congressional policy of accommodating our shipping
lines' business practices to those of the rest of the world.
Perhaps these two congressional policies are at war with
t B.S. University of Virginia; LL.B. George Washington University Law
School; Member of New York, Virginia and District of Columbia Bars;
Special Assistant to Commissioner John S. Patterson of the Federal Maritime
Commission.
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the Federal Maritime Commission.
There is absolutely no present antagonism between the Department of
Justice and the Federal Maritime Commission. This article deals solely with
past issues. In the past, opposing positions have been taken on the issues
discussed herein. Whether or not such positions would be taken on any
future issues is impossible to say.
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themselves. If so, some conflict is inevitable. In any event,
no prominent effort has been made to end this wasteful
disputation. Whether inevitable or unresolvable, the purpose
here will be to suggest a line of effort toward a little peace
and harmony between two distinguished agencies.
The chief obstacle to even a beginning at any solution
are factors beyond congressional control in the form of a
stubborn refusal by nationals, outside our jurisdiction, to
accept what they regard as our self-righteous notions of
business morality. Yet, implicit in at least one of the
ambivalent congressional policies is a realistic recognition
that internationally we are outweighed in influence, if not
in high-mindedness. The subject of the fight is the validity
of entrenched and venerable trade practices which evolved
out of business necessities when steam-powered, self-propelled
ships replaced sailing ships in ocean commerce among
nations. One side seeks to impose our policy of opposing
price-fixing agreements and combinations in restraint of
trade on the activities of rate-fixing associations or con-
ferences of steamship lines. The other side seeks to preserve
these organizations and their exclusive patronage contracts
as a useful device for the conduct of world shipping in
areas where our virtuous policies do not prevail.
Two lines of attack have emerged to impose the anti-
trust morality on these trade practices. One line is to
promote court-sanctioned interpretations of law to forbid
conferences of ocean carrier shipping lines from fixing freight
rates. If this fails, the next line is to invalidate or control
conferences' practices of using exclusive patronage contracts
with shippers as a condition of getting discounted freight
rates. The attack on the contract is the subject of this
article.
The suggestion is offered that if more is known about
the genesis and purpose of traditional international trading
practices a resolution of the conflict may be possible. If
not, at least excessive zealotry in regard to proper national
policy may be restrained at a saving of litigious energy
and money, and harmony and contentment promoted.
There seem to be at least three lines of thought about
how to deal with exclusive patronage contracts. One of
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the doctrines is that when a number of steamship lines,
associated together in a conference, adopt two levels of
freight rates and offer lower or discount rates to shippers
who sign an exclusive patronage contract with the conference
and the higher to non-signers, the conference is necessarily
acting unlawfully by engaging in an oppressive competitive
practice, or by stifling competition or by using a retaliatory
device.1 The expression used is that this trade practice,
commonly called the dual-rate system, is unlawful per se.2
Another line of thinking is that the trade practice
is a legitimate accommodation to the needs of shippers,
and a method of self-preservation for the conferences which
is sanctioned by the Shipping Act of 1916,1 hereafter
referred to as the Act.
A third line of thought recently proposed is that the
coercive effect *of the practice be recognized, and that its
use be authorized to meet and oppose the coercive effect
of non-conference cut-rate competition.4 In this view the
practice is not necessarily illegal if it is shown to be a
necessary retaliatory competitive measure. This emphasis
on the necessities of each position typifies the paucity of
facts and soundly-based arguments on the subject.
The conflicting arguments and the resulting uncertainties
from these divergent interpretations pose a serious problem
for ship lines faced with a necessity of making arrangements
with shippers under assurances that they are acting in
conformity with the law and particularly with the new
1The doctrine has been expressed as follows: "Use of a dual-rate
system by a conference is essentially coercive and discriminatory as to
shippers and exclusionary as to carriers." Statement by Mr. Kirkpatrick,
Acting Attorney General, before Celler Committee quoted in Hearings Before
the Special Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of the Houe Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1961).2 Brief for Petitioner, p. 2, Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co.,
356 U.S. 481 (1958), framed the basic question as being: "Whether the
dual-rate system of ocean freight rates . . . is per se illegal under the
Shipping Act of 1916 and therefore beyond the power of the Federal Mari-
time Board to approve under Section 15 of that Act."
339 Stat. 728 (1916), 46 U.S.C. §801 (1958).
4 Dodds, Legality of Shipper Tying Arrangements in Ocean Commerce,
23 U. PiTr. L. Rev. 933, 949 (1962) ; see Seaver & Schmeltzer, The Role of
Conferences and the Dual Rate System in Ocean Foreign Trade, 24 LAw &
CoNTEmp. PROB. 605, 609 (1959).
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congressional enactments.' Some of the supporting argu-
ments and the circumstances out of which the conflicts
arose and recent legislative changes will be reviewed. It
will be shown that even though traditionally acceptable
business practices and implementing contracts, as approved
by the courts, validate most exclusive patronage contract
schemes using two levels of freight rates, more evidence
should be obtained as to the extent of the shipping business
practices around 1916 to find out whether or not Congress
intended to condemn the practices to the same extent that
it intended to condemn the use of rebates, fighting ships,
retaliation, discrimination and other unfair methods which
are more specifically mentioned in the Act. It will be
proposed further that if the necessary competitive measure
justification for retaliation or coercion is adopted, and if
recent court decisions are extended, the results may be
disastrous for shipping conferences.
Inferences and assumptions about the dominant pur-
poses of the attacked practices are now used to support
arguments for each position. The purpose of obtaining
the new evidence would be to substitute facts for what is
now inferred or assumed, and to test the validity of some
of the positions proposed herein. Such fact gathering would
be the task of a congressional committee as legislation
may eventually be needed to clarify the problem if current
arguments are pushed to their conclusion.
The new strength of arguments against the validity of
present practices is of recent origin. Until 1956, legitimacy
had been the dominant view judging by the absence of any
express statutory prohibition or judicial decision of illegality
and the continued use 'of the practice. Generally, the
5 75 Stat. 764, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. III, 1961) provides that "existing
agreements which are lawful . . . immediately prior to enactment of this
Act, [before October 3, 1961] shall remain lawful ...Provided, however,
That all such existing agreements which are rendered unlawful, by the
provisions of such Act as hereby amended must be amended . . . and if
such amendments are filed for approval within six months after the enact-
ment of this Act, [April 3, 1962] such agreements so amended shall be
lawful for a further period of not to exceed one year [April 3, 1963] after
such filing." Pub. L. No. 88-5 deleted the words "of not to exceed one
year after such filing" and substituted "but not beyond April 3, 1964."
77 Stat. 5 (1963).
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practice has been considered to be sufficiently consistent
with statutory provisions to warrant approval by the
Federal Maritime Commission, and its predecessor agencies.
More recent history, however, has shaken some of the
assumptions underlying these trade practices and of their
approvability under Section 14b in the recent amendments
of the Act. 6
In 1956 the proponents of the line of thought con-
demning all such agreements as coercive seemed to have
finally scored a victory. In Isbrandtsen Co. v. United
Sates,7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the use of a dual-rate contract was prima facie dis-
criminatory. The circumstances were that associated member
lines of the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference had
been competing along the same trade routes with the Is-
brandtsen Company, a steamship line which was not a
member of the conference and which refused to become a
member. The court, in striking down the use of a dual-rate
system, stated that since the provisions of the shippers' con-
tracts "are unlawful the system containing them cannot
validly be approved by the Board." 8 It was also noted by the
court that the dual-rate system constituted retaliation, and
as such must be condemned without regard to the question
of reasonableness.9
The Supreme Court 11 affirmed this decision by agreeing
that the order of the Board approving the contract system
of the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference should
be set aside. The language of the Court's decision left
considerable doubt. It is not certain whether it adopted
and endorsed the circuit court's general condemnation of
the conference practice as unlawful or just decided that
since the Board had found that the dual-rate contract of
the conference was a necessary competitive measure to
675 Stat. 762, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. III, 1961). For a discussion of
this new legislation see Gorman, Shipping Conferences and the Bonner Act,
1961, J. Bus. L. 24 (Jan. 1962).
7239 F2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nor. Federal Maritime Bd.
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
8Id. at 937.
9 Id. at 933.
10 Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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offset the effect of non-conference competition in order to
obtain for its members a greater participation in the cargo
moving in the trade, it follows that the contract was a
resort to other discriminating or unfair methods to stifle
outside competition in violation of Section 14 Third of the
Act." The doubts were created by the dissenting opinion
which stated that "the Court thus outlaws a practice that
has prevailed among international steamship conferences
for half a century'.' when the majority held that "any dual
system of international steamship rates tied to exclusive
patronage contracts that is designed to meet outside com-
petition . . . violates § 14 of the Shipping Act. . ,, 12
On the other hand, there are those who think the majority's
qualification as to practices "designed to meet outside com-
petition" is significant. In recognition of the qualification,
Congress enacted legislation to forestall any completely
invalidating effect of the Court's decision on the trade
practice, as implied by the dissent.
The most recent development affecting the trade practice
is the addition of Section 14b to the Act which, for the
first time, expressly refers to contracts that provide lower
rates to shippers who agree to give their patronage to a
carrier or conference of carriers and authorizes the Federal
Maritime Commission to give permission for their use. The
new law did not provide any standards for judging
detriments to commerce or contrariety with public interest.
Therefore, in light of the dissenting opinion that the practice
has been outlawed, those who would argue that no standards
are needed because the practice is necessarily unlawful under
Section 14 Third and argue that the burden is on the pro-
ponents to show standards of lawfulness seem to have the
offensive.'3
11 Id. at 492.12 Id. at 500 (dissenting opinion). The outlawry characterization by the
dissenting justice is shared by at least one writer on the subject when he
concluded: "the Supreme Court ... held that the contract rate system was
a retaliatory device forbidden by section 14." Gardner, Steamship Con-ferences mid the Shipping Act, 1916, 35 Tum. L. REv. 129, 133 (1960).
13 The position of the Department of Justice concerning the new legisla-
tion has been stated as follows: "The Department of Justice considers in-
dispensable . . . the inclusion of language unequivocally barring the approval
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This article will examine the validity of the newly
strengthened "necessary unlawfulness" argument by review-
ing in detail recent history showing what the practice
consists of in its present form, the events which caused the
practice to be condemned by the Supreme Court, the events
following the Isbrandtsen decision leading to the amendment
of the Act and the law as it now stands. This review of
recent history will be compared with the earlier ] istory
of the practice in an effort to see if anything turns up
which might be useful in establishing standards for future
action under Section 14b of the Act.
In its present form the practice consists of a tvo
level, or discount, tariff system plus an agreement among
conference members to prepare and tender a standard form
of shippers' contract with the conference. Pursuant to the
contract, the conference members collectively agree to take
and carry all the shippers' merchandise at the specified
freight rates and the shippers agree not to patronize, for a
specific period, any other than the conference lines. This
is the plan that is thought to be illegal unless some beneficial
competitive purpose is shown.
Normally, an agreement among shipping conference
lines to fix rates would be void as against the public policy
of this country. The conference lines agree among them-
selves on the rates to be charged shippers, on the terms
of exclusive patronage contracts, and on the differentials
to be offered shippers who sign contracts and those who do
not. They agree to restrain competition among each other
for shippers' cargoes and otherwise to control, through their
monopoly over part of the trade, the conditions relating
to the carriage of shippers' property. The conference con-
tracts become consistent with our public policy if the
conferences file their agreements of association and state-
ments about their "contract-non-contract rates" plans with
the Commission and obtain its approval. The contracts are
thereafter excepted from the anti-trust laws which make
of such agreements where they are intended to or will reasonably likely
cause the exclusion of another carrier from the trade." Letter from Byron
White, Deputy Attorney General, to Senator Magnuson, Aug. 8, 1961.
1964 ]
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them otherwise illegal. 4 Section 15 of the Act creates
this exception on the condition of approval. 15 Before the
Commission may give its approval it must decide that the
agreement of association does not violate the Act, and is
not "unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers,
shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or . . . operate
to the detriment of the commerce of the United States
,, 16
Against this background, one of the most controversial
and significant litigations in the history of the administration
of the Shipping Act began after the former Board approved
a conference statement proposing to institute its contract-
non-contract rates plan. In December 1952 such an ap-
proval was applied for by the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf
Freight Conference. This was the first critical move bringing
official focus on the events culminating in the Supreme
Court's condemnation of the conference's plan in the
Isbrandtsen case. The application for approval was pur-
suant to the Board's General Order -No. 76. Protests
against the application were filed by Isbrandtsen and by
the Department of Justice. Institution of the practice
was enjoined in the courts. A little over three years later
the Board, after being taken to the courts on procedural
issues, 7 ordered "that the agreement embodied in and
constituting the aforesaid statement filed by the . . .
Conference . . . be, and the same is hereby, in all respects
approved under Section 15 of the Shipping Act ... , , 18
In support of its order, the Board found that from 1928
through 1941 "the conference employed a dual-rate system," 1'
and that in 1934 the system was extended "to cover all
important commodities moving in the trade."20
1426 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
1539 Stat. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958). Federal Maritime Conm'n
Gen. Order No. 76 covers approval of "contract-non-contract rates" plans.
46 C.F.R. §236.1 (1958).1639 Stat. 734 (1916), 46 U.S.C. §814 (1958).
17See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.D.C.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
18 Japan-Atlantic Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 706, 743 (1955).
19 Id. at 710.
20 Ibid.
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In 1947, Isbrandtsen began operating from Japan to
Atlantic coast ports, but refused to join the conference.
At this time the so-called dual-rate system had not been
re-activated. Isbrandtsen's competition in the form of
lower rates during this period was found to be the subject
of constant concern for conference members, and, in March
1953, rates were "opened" which meant that each conference
member line made its own rates instead of using conference
rates. Individual lines could now undercut Isbrandtsen's
rates. The Board noted that after July 1953, Isbrandtsen
carried little cargo in the trade.
Before 1953 there occurred a phenomenon that has
never really been explained satisfactorily-concern over
competition during a period of increasing rates. In spite
of the findings of competitive necessity for what had hap-
pened during the period from 1947 on, the Board stated
that "the level of rates in conference post-war Tariffs grad-
ually increased between 1947 and November 15, 1952." 21
Afterwards, in March 1953, genuine rate reductions, directed
at independent competition, occurred resulting in the dis-
appearance of business for Isbrandtsen in July 1953. Rate
reductions between March and July 1953, and not com-
petitive conditions in the preceding five years, apparently
drove Isbrandtsen out of the trade. The conference asked
for approval of its plan to offer the exclusive patronage
contract with two rate levels in December 1952, but the
disappearance of Isbrandtsen's business cannot be traced
to this move because the conference did not receive approval
until January 1956. Operation of the practice before that
time had been enjoined.
The Board's rationalization of its approval required a
choice between only two justifications-competitive necessity
or excessive rate reductions-but seldom has such a simple
choice had such drastic and far-reaching consequences. The
long period of conference concern with Isbran.dtsen com-
petition led the Board in its report to ask itself: "Is the
initiation of a dual-rate system necessary or required, as
21Id. at 713.
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a competitive measure, to insure or restore stability of rates
and service to shippers in the trade . . . ?" The Board
answered its own question, finding that the inauguration
of a dual-rate system was a necessary competitive measure
to offset the effect of independent competition in this trade.21
The Board's order followed up this conclusion by approving
the conference's application "to institute a dual-rate system
in this trade . . . effective January 1, 1956." The Board's
choice of the "necessary competitive measure" justification
turned out to be crucial. On the facts before it, as disclosed
in its own report, the Board might well have found rate
cutting and chosen to regard this fact as the damaging com-
petitive measure, not the exclusive patronage contracts and
dual-rate system. The Board might have approved the
contract dual-rate system, which was in effect in some form
since 1928, simply as a legitimate trade practice having no
essential relation to competition in this case. The die was
cast, -however, and the Board's choice provoked long and
expensive litigation for the respondent conference and un-
certainty for the entire shipping industry for years to
come, because it reached right into the nerve center of an
historic and well-entrenched trading system.
Isbrandtsen's response, joined by the Department of
Justice and the Department of Agriculture, was to appeal
the decision in the courts, with the claim that the Board
had no authority to approve a dual-rate system because
it would be in violation of the Act as a discriminatory
and retaliatory measure. The Supreme Court ended court
consideration of these controversial issues when it reversed
the Board's order in a decision which immediately provoked
discussion of its true scope and intent.
The scene of subsequent events shifted from the courts
to Congress. Congressional reaction to the Isbrandtsen
decision was prompt, but as it turned out, no more clear
than the decision. Hearings on the effect of the decision
were started by the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. The Committee proposed legislation to
22 Id. at 736.
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overcome some of the effects of the decision. After taldng
note of the lack of clarity in some of the Court's language,
the Committee predicted widespread confusion and endless
litigation.23 To eliminate any bad effects of widespread
confusion and to curb litigious impulses to determine the
decision's full impact on traditional practices, the Com-
mittee proposed, and Congress enacted, legislation declaring
valid "any dual-rate contract arrangement in use ... unless
• . . [the Federal Maritime Board] disapproves, cancels
or modifies such arrangement." 24  The validation applied
to "any dual rate contract arrangement in use by members
of a conference on May 19, 1958, which conference is
organized under an agreement approved under Section 15
of this Act. .... "
The legislation, approved August 12, 1958, was con-
strued to limit invalidity to the actions of the Japan-Atlantic
Conference and to validate the arrangements of other
conferences, whose contracts had been theretofore approved
by the Board. The congressional limitation was to last only
until the Board had gone back and reviewed all previously
approved arrangements and reached new conclusions about
whether they involved necessary competitive measures to
offset the effect of non-conference competition.23 The val-
23 S. REP. No. 1497, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1960).
2472 Stat. 574, 46 U.S.C. §812 (1958).
2 5 In the Matter of Pasch, 26 Misc. 2d 918, 209 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct.
1960), aff'd mem., 13 App. Div. 2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1st Dep't),
motion for leave ta appeal granted, 9 N.Y.2d 965, 176 N.E.2d 502, 218
N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961). The court stated: "The legislative history of this
amendment makes plain the intention of Congress, by this legislation, to
provide the industry with a moratorium during which Congress might study
and investigate, to the end that appropriate legislation might thereafter be
enacted. Petitioner asserts the amendment preserves the validity of the
dual-rate contracts now under consideration. Respondents argue to the con-
trary and contend the amendment was intended to do no more than preserve
the status quo that had been disturbed by the adjudication of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the later Isbrandtsen case; that it was not
the intention of Congress to limit the effects of the adjudication in the
earlier Isbrandtsen case, and, as a consequence, the amendment must be
deemed to include the qualification that exclusive patronage dual-rate con-
tracts must, in any event, have been approved by the Federal Maritime Board
to acquire validity. I reach a different conclusion. Respondents' contention
as to the meaning of the amendment works a distortion in the language
employed by Congress which plainly states . . . 'unless and until such
regulatory body disapproves, cancels or modifies such arrangement in accord-
19641]
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idating legislation by its terms expired June 30, 1960, thus
providing, according to the Committee's report, "what is
considered to be a reasonable time for a thorough con-
sideration of the procedures necessary to resolve the dis-
location resulting from a recent Supreme Court decision." 2
This hope proved to be overly sanguine and another ex-
tension had to be granted because the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which was also consid-
ering remedial legislation, found it "impossible to digest
the voluminous records in order to prepare a report" or to
recommend legislative action after eighteen months of "hold-
ing hearings and making an intensive study into the
problems which have been presented." 27 More legislation
extending the validation of the dual-rate practices until
June 30, 1961, was enacted.28 When the expiration date
arrived the digestion problem continued to be as difficult
as ever, and, as a remedy another extension until September
15, 1961, was prescribed.29 Still another dose of deferral
until October 15, 1961, had to be taken." Each prescription
for the relief of congressional digestive difficulties canoe as
a narrow escape from the uncertain and litigation-inducing
effects of the Isbrandtsen decision. The first extension was
approved by the President and became law June 29, 1960,
the day before expiration; the second, on June 30, 1961,
the day of expiration; the third, on September 16, 1961,
the day after expiration; and the fourth brought final
legislative relief on October 3, 1961,31 a record-making twelve
days before the last extension expired.
ance with the standards set forth in section 15 of this Act.' It would have
been a simple matter for Congress, if it desired to do so, to insert appro-
priate language in the amendment limiting the validity of the dual-rate
contracts to those actually approved by the Board.. It is incredible to assume
that Congress was wholly unaware of the earlier Isbrandtsen case when it
enacted the legislation. I conclude Congress neither intended nor desired
to limit the effect of the amendment in the manner suggested by respondents."
Id. at 924, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
26 S. REP. No. 1497, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1960).
27 H.R. Ru'.. No. 1403, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
2874 Stat -253, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. II, 1960).
2975 Stat. 195, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. III, 1961).
3075 Stat. 521, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. III, 1961).
31 75 Stat. 762, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. III, 1961).
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The desperation caused by congressional inability to
find a cure for its digestive distress was vividly shown in
the last extension to October 15, 1961, which, with a
mighty reach for maritime relevance, was made a part
of a law to make the Panama Canal Company immune from
attachment or garnishment of salaries owed to its employees
and "to amend the Shipping Act, 1916." 32 Any digestive
distress of congressional committees during this period, from
August 12, 1958, to October 3, 1961, can hardly match the
ulcer-inducing conditions that must have been faced by many
industry leaders confronted with doubts as to the validity
of long-standing trade practices and with expensive litigation
in this period. The leaders should also have been concerned
with the results of the Federal Maritime Board's review of
their dual-rate contract arrangements for conformity with
the Isbrandtsem decision's interpretation of the Act in re-
sponse to the congressional reprieve. A few invalidating
orders might be expected.
At least one industry leader, the chairman of the East
Coast Columbia Conference, was actually involved in litiga-
tion over the dual-rate issue. Although the congressional
hope of avoiding further litigation about the validity of
exclusive patronage contracts was realized as a result of the
interim legislation, ever-alert lawyers found an issue in
the meaning of the interim legislation. There is no rest
for the wicked.
The chairman of the East Coast Columbia Conference
petitioned the New York Supreme Court to compel two
shippers to arbitrate a dispute with the conference over
the obligations of a dual-rate exclusive patronage contract.
The respondent shippers replied that the arbitration con-
tract had not been approved by the Board, and the temporary
legislation did not preserve its validity in the absence of
express Board approval. 3' The new legislation, it was argued,
3275 Stat. 521, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. III, 1961).
33 1n the Matter of Pasch, 26 Misc. 2d 925, 210 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct
1960), aff'd mer., 13 App. Div. 2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1st Dep't),
motion for leave to apf~eal granted, 9 N.Y2d 965, 176 N.E.2d 502, 218
N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961). But see Kempner v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 313 F.2d
586, 587 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963).
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could not reach back and validate what the Supreme Court
had found invalid under Section 14 of the Act. The New
York court held the contracts executed by the conference,
including the arbitration clause, valid under the interim
legislation, granted the chairman's petition and directed the
arbitration to proceed. Another industry leader testified in
1961 that "[f or over three years the industry has been
in a state of uncertainty, and trading conditions between
the United States and the rest of the world have deteriorated
as a result." "
During the same period the Board, with its own severe
health problems, brought on by exposure to the criticisms
of Congressman Emanuel Celler, chairman of the Anti-
trust Subcommittee (No. 5) of the House Committee on
the Judiciary," had not been idle and began to consider
long dormant dual-rate issues during this period. A com-
plaint, which had been filed in 1953 by Isbrandtsen as a
shipper of cotton and by four other cotton shippers iden-
tified with the Kempner cotton shipping interests, against
States Marine, Lykes, Waterman and several other lines
operating from the G'ulf of Mexico to Japan and to Mediter-
ranean ports was deemed ripe for decision. The issues in
this proceeding were thought to be the same as those in
the Japan-Atlantic Conference case-the validity of the dual-
rate contract practice-possibly because of the fact that
the carriers used exclusive patronage contracts and two
rate levels, and because of the presence of the perennial
maverick Isbrandtsen as a complainant. The complaints
against the Far East Conference and the Gulf Mediterranean
Ports Conference were that they used the dual-rate contract
system in violation of the Act. Here too it was argued
that the system was necessarily unlawful and that the
conference lines could neither ask shippers to sign an
invalid contract nor charge the higher of two rate levels
because of its unlawfulness. Naturally the lower rate level
34 Testimony by Mr. Wierda before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 100(1961).
35 H.R.J. REs. No. 56, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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was thought to be the valid one. The facts in Isbrandtsen's
case against the Japan-Atlantic Conference before the Su-
preme Court, and the facts before the Board in Isbrandtsen's
case against the Far East and Mediterranean Conferences
were quite different, however. The differences were that
in the latter proceeding Isbrandtsen was a shipper and no
outside or independent carrier competition with the confer-
ences had been shown to exist. Isbrandtsen was so com-
pletely outside the trade it had to suffer the indignity of
becoming a shipper. In the Supreme Court case Isbrandtsen
was complaining as an independent carrier who was being
harmed by the competitive tactics of the conference. As
shippers, neither Isbrandtsen nor the Kempner interests
produced any evidence of harmful competitive effects on
other carriers, but relied instead on arguments that the
system itself was invalid regardless of proof of competitive
effect. Lack of proof on this critical point controlled
the outcome of the case, as it should have. Another and
important difference was that the shippers themselves had
requested an exclusive patronage contract and two rate levels.
The conferences did not initiate it for competitive reasons.
The Board recognized the absence of carrier competition
and the presence of shipper solicitation as vital differences
from the earlier proceeding when it held that the dual-
rate contract system employed by the respondents was
not being used as a competitive measure and was not shown
to have been designed to meet outside competition, and
therefore was lawful. 6  The Board stated that past court
3 6 Isbrandtsen Co. v. States Marine Corp., 6 F.M.B. 422 (1961). The
portions of the Board's order applicable to Isbrandtsen and States Marine
were upheld, but Isbrandtsen was held to be entitled to interest on its repara-
tion from the date of filing its complaint and not from the date of the
Board's order. States Marine Lines, Inc., v. Federal Alaritime Comm'n, 315
F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Board's order applicable to Kempner and
the Gulf Mediterranean Ports Conference was reversed and remanded for
assessment of reparations. Kempner v. Federal Maritime Comm's, 313 F.2d
586 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Kentpncr decision contains an unexplainable error of
fact as a basis for the decision. The decision stated that the "discriminatory
rates here involved were not approved by the regulatory agency . . . and
were illegal." Id. at 587. No rates were in evidence in the record, the
Commission's report is silent as to rates, approval of the rates was not
challenged by any party nor made an issue anywhere in the case and the
approval of tariff rates was simply a non-existent factor in the case. Such
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decisions dealing with the trade practice do not "declare
the practice or system unauthorized under all circumstances"
nor did the Supreme Court in the Isbrandten case set
aside any Board orders insofar as they approve the exclusive
patronage system as a general proposition, but only dis-
approved the particular use of the system by a conference
in such a way as to injure an independent common carrier
by water. 7
The complainants' adherence to the doctrinaire theory
regarding the inherent invalidity of the dual-rate contract
system must have led them to their relaxed position as to
the lack of any need for facts showing competitive injury.
The complainants must also have shared, ahead of time, the
Senate Committee's predicted widespread confusion about
the effect of the Supreme Court's 1958 holding, 38 by not
realizing that differences in proof would compel a different
result. Eight days after the report in the Isbrandtsen-States
Marine case, the Board's own health problems were resolved
by the abolition of the patient and by the creation of a
new five member Federal Maritime Commission.
The abolition of the Maritime Board, the Board's report
in the Isbrandtsen-States Marine case which clarified the
distinction between the trade practice of giving freight rate
discounts to signers of exclusive patronage contracts and
the terms of individual shippers' contracts, followed by
new legislation which likewise embodies a recognition of
differences between the permissibility of the trade practice
and the standards for approving shippers' contracts, all in
the Fall of 1961, should provide a fresh start on thinking
about the future validity of the practice and should assuage
many industry leaders' afflictions of recent years.
The failure to distinguish between the validity of the
system as a generalized trade practice and the validity of
reliance on non-existent evidence is so inexplicable that one must conclude
that it results from an error in the presentation, a careless reading of briefs
and arguments, or an inaccuracy in the use of language in the preparation
of the opinion..of sbrandtsen Co. v. States Marine Corp., supra note 36.
3s The briefs and arguments in this case were prepared and delivered in
1956-1957.
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specific terms of individual exclusive patronage contracts
has been a source of much of the confusion and conflicting
argument. In the Isbrandtsen-States Marine case the argu-
ment was made that since the practice or system was illegal,
the exclusive patronage contract tendered to Isbrandtsen
was necessarily illegal too without reference to its terms.
One commentator makes a point of the fact that the Supreme
Court in the most recent Isbrandtsen case upheld the dis-
tinction between the exclusive patronage contracts used
around 1916 and those used today, and follows this obser-
vation by a reference to "the legality of dual rate systems"
as a "burning issue" and recommends the "authorization of
dual rate systems only as defensive weapons of conferences
for the purpose of limiting . . . competition." 39 The repre-
sentatives of the Department of Justice also invariably
discuss the shippers' contracts and the operation of the
system together, and the Supreme Court itself in the
Isbrandtsen case first described the dual-rate contracts and
then held that section 14 "strikes down dual rate systems"
where certain conditions exist.4  This sequence of ideas
is a source of misunderstanding.
The approvability of an exclusive patronage contract
should be on an individual basis through application of
specific standards, whereas the approvability of a general
system or trade practice should be governed by broad con-
siderations of public policy, and each should be dealt with
as a separate issue. The Act, as recently amended, makes
the distinct standards quite clear by providing in section 14b
for a procedure to obtain permission to use shippers' exclusive
patronage contracts providing lower rates to signatories
and for the application of specific standards of approvability.
The Shipping Act was amended to authorize lawful
continuation of "any dual rate contract arrangement in
use by the members of a conference" unless disapproved
by the newly created Commission, and to authorize the
Commission to "permit the use by any common carrier or
39 Dodds, Legality of Shipper Tying Arrangements in Ocean Commerce,
23 U. PITT. L. REv. 933, 941, 957 (1962).4 0 Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 493, 497 (1958).
1964 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
conference of such carriers in foreign commerce of any
contract . . . which provides lower rates to a shipper or
consignee who agrees to give all or any fixed portion of
his patronage to such carrier or conference of carriers unless
the Commission finds that the contract, amendment or
modification thereof will be detrimental to the commerce of
the United States or contrary to the public interest, or
unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers, ex-
porters, importers, or ports" provided the contract contains
nine different types of provisions. Thus the new law elimi-
nates the general condemnation or outlawry implications of
the 1958 Isbrandtsen decision, and exclusive patronage con-
tracts as a part of an arrangement or system of two rate
levels are not now invalid under any circumstances, as long as
the Commission gives permission to use them.4 However,
the validity of the trade practice of requiring exclusive
patronage contracts under section 14, when certain com-
petitive conditions exist, is not so clear.
The fact that the Commission must now make findings
as to the effect of an exclusive patronage dual-rate contract
system when it is initiated still leaves the eventual status
of the practice in doubt because of the often expressed view
that the "normal inherent intent of any dual-rate system
is to exclude competition." 42 If this assumption is ever
proven, the Commission could not approve agreements even
under the new law. All the new law gives is certain
41 It has been stated that the new law "legalizes, subject to several
limitations, the use of the so-called dual-rate systems. . . ." Statement
by President Kennedy, Oct. 4, 1961. In its report on section 14b the
House of Representatives stated that the section expressly authorizes "the
use of dual-rate systems by conferences, irrespective of the presence or
absence of non-conference competition." H.R. REP. No. 498, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1961).
Before considering section 14b, the Commission's predecessors had to
review and pass on dual-rate agreements by virtue of section 15 as inter-
preted in Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954). See also River Plate & Brazil Conference v.
Pressed Steel Car Co., 227 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1955); Pacific Westbound
Conference v. Leval & Co., 201 Ore. 390, 269 P.2d 541, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 897 (1954).
42 See Statements by Messrs. Crinkley, Loevinger and Aptaker, quoted in
Hearings Before thi Special Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of the
Htouse Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
348, 424, 469 (1961).
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preliminary presumptions of validity. We still do not
know what specific factors make "public interest."
A review of the history of the exclusive patronage
contract should help to. disclose what factors of public inter-
est created the trade practice of using the contract, and
whether they are such as to sustain "inherent intent" as-
sumptions of the invalidity theory. The history of con-
ferences and their uses of the exclusive patronage contract
with rate differentials suggests that the inherent intent
to stifle competition, the competitive measure, and the
retaliatory- device notions are newcomers and that self-
preservation through the shipper-tie and advantages to
shippers through relatively unchanging rates and assured
service are the dominant incentives for using the system.
Much of the newly discovered proof of bad effects, as one
might suspect where such expressions as "necessarily," "in-
herent" and "per se" are used, is argumentative, inferential
and not based on factual findings of damage to the public.
Exclusive patronage contracts between shippers and
ocean carriers are older than conferences and precede even
the use of rebates, which were the first shipper-conference
tying arrangements thought to have adverse effects on com-
petition. Rate differentials, or dual rates, between con-
tracting shippers and other shippers pursuant to rate
schedules are almost as early in time, having begun some
time after 1875, about the same time as conferences
originated.4 3 By 1906 the conference system and the con-
ference use of exclusive patronage contracts with shippers
was an established practice, and rate differentials, then
called discounts, were in use, although not in general use.
The rebate system was more generally used."
Two significant conclusions emerge from the history
of shipping conferences: first, the use of exclusive patronage
contracts providing for less than tariff rates or rate dif-
43 The first conference between shipowners appears to have been organized
in 1875 and was known as the Calcutta Conference. It concerned the tea
trade between Calcutta and London.
44 The history and background for these practices has been reported in
the REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON SHIPPING RINGS (1909).
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ferentials was an established practice long before the Act
in 1916, and existed at the time of the Act; second, the trade
practice was brought about principally in response to de-
mands of shippers. BCompetitive considerations were present,
but the dominant competitive weapon was rate reductions
rather than the contract. The intent and effect of the
contract and two rate levels traditionally has not been
to meet outside competition but to assist shippers. The
conference agreements between carriers may have been de-
signed primarily to dominate the competition and rate
cutting to drive out competition, not the exclusive patronage
contract nor the differential in freight rates.
Since this trade practice was so well known in American
and British ocean commerce by 1916, it would have been
anomalous for Congress in 1916 to outlaw the practice by
inference rather than expressly as it did in the case of
rebates. This conclusion has not only the support of
history, but also the findings of a congressional committee
and subsequent court decisions. The only remotely possible
court qualification prior to the Isbrandtsen decision in 1958
was a Supreme Court decision in 1917 reversing a district
court decision upholding a conference combination.45
Before legislative inquiry, the courts had reviewed
conference combinations in England and found them to be
consistent with the common law in Mogul Steamship Co.
v. McGregor.46 In 1890, in the United States, public policy
took a different direction with the enactment of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.47  The Sherman Act, as originally enacted,
made any combination in restraint of trade or commerce,
including part of the trade or commerce with foreign nations,
by any person a misdemeanor. This act defined person to
include corporations and associations existing under the
laws of any foreign country. The Supreme Court held that
the law applied to all contracts tending to create a monopoly
whether or not they are unlawful at common law.48  This
45 United States v. Prince Line, 242 U.S. 537 (1917), reversing, 220
Fed. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
46 [1880] 23 L.R. 598.
4726 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).4 8 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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seems to make the Sherman Act applicable to conference
combinations. The applicability of the Sherman Act to
steamship conferences and to their contracts did not receive
judicial interpretation in the United States, although the
case of United States v. Prince Line 11 posed the issue. The
purpose of the suit was to dissolve alleged unlawful com-
binations and to enjoin 'certain practices of the respective
companies. With the exception of an injunction against
certain discriminatory practices, the bills were dismissed.
The district court upheld the conference combination in-
cluding the use of the rebate although it conceded that the
questions presented had become largely academic because of
the advent of the First World War. On appeal to the
Supreme Court the judgment was reversed, since war con-
ditions had caused the cases to become moot and the Court
was without power to review the issue on the merits."0
In 1912, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries (commonly called the Alexander Committee) was
directed to make a complete and thorough investigation of
the methods and practices of the various shipping lines,
both domestic and foreign, engaged in carrying our overseas
or foreign commerce. The Committee was to investigate
whether any such ship lines had formed any agreements
among one another for the purpose of fixing rates and
tariffs, or of giving and receiving rebates, special rates,
or other special privileges or advantages, or for the purpose
of pooling or dividing their earnings, losses or traffic, or
for the purpose of preventing or destroying competition.
After making recommendations regarding the necessity
for governmental scrutiny and approval of specified types
of agreements the Committee proposed legislation which
finally became the Shipping Act of 1916.81 The Com-
mittee's summary and recommendations indicate that while
Congress was familiar with the practice of using exclusive
49220 Fed. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), rev'd, 242 U.S. 537 (1917).
BOUnited States v. Prince Line, 242 U.S. 537 (1917); see Huttlinger
v. Royal Dutch W. India Mail, 180 App. Div. 114, 167 N.Y. Supp. 158
(2d Dep't 1917).
G1Hearings Before the House Coinmittee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 290 (1913).
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patronage contracts with shippers and with the use of rate
differentials, it regarded conference agreements and rebate
clauses and practices as something distinct from such con-
tracts. Current efforts to lump all these practices together
and to make them all subject to the Act's prohibitions are
out of place. Only the two practices mentioned were the
principal subjects of investigation and of the legislation
that resulted. The Committee considered exclusive patronage
contracts as not against public policy and that they were
an accepted trade practice neither requiring extensive inquiry
nor legislative action.
It is not surprising then that exclusive patronage con-
tracts and rate differentials as conference trade arrange-
ments have not been completely invalidated. Certain aspects
of the arrangement such as excessive rate differentials have
been invalidated because they were arbitrarily selected 52
or were undue or unreasonable. 3 The administrative pro-
cedures or formality of approval under Section 15 of the
Act have been declared improper,54 and the Shipping Board
has condemned the arrangement where it operates solely
to effect a monopoly,55 but the trade practice as such had
never been declared invalid per se until the circuit court
so held in the Isbrandtsen case.56
Up to this point and until 1958, a period of about
eighty-three years following the formation of -the first shipping
conference in 1875, exclusive patronage contracts had sur-
52 See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed sub norn. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 336 U.S. 941 (1948) (per curiam).
53 Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
54 River Plate & Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 124 F.
Supp. 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 227 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1955).
5 Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41 (1922).
The Eden case is the first case in which the dual-rate question was presented
to a predecessor of the Commission for determination of legality under the
Act It was held to be a violation both of section 16 and section 17 to
have an exclusive patronage contract providing for a more favorable rate
for contract shippers than for non-contract shippers. The second case was
Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, 1 U.S.S.B. 285 (1933). The Rawleigh case dis-
tinguished the Eden case as involving a single carrier monopolizing the
trade in comparison with conference dual-rate systems which are established
by several carriers.
56239 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956), aff'd sub noa. Federal Maritime Bd.
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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vived legislative inquiry and judicial scrutiny in both Great
Britain and America without being found to be a retaliatory
device and, as such, sufficiently contrary to public policy to
justify remedial legislation or adverse court order through
interpretation of existing legislation.
The history of the trade practice does not eonflict with
the Committee's findings and suggests that unless it has
undergone drastic modification since then, or unless the
contracts have become unduly oppressive, restrictive legisla-
tion is still not justified. The exclusive patronage contract
and discounts are still regarded as an accommodation to
shippers desiring relatively unchanging rate conditions. There
is no intent to retaliate or to stifle competition in such a
situation, but only to assure the lines of a steady flow of
cargoes and income to support regular departures, and to
help shippers to make forward booking contracts with
reasonable assurance that delivery prices will not change
much in the meantime. The shippers who are a mainstay
of the trade want a lower rate than those who are not.
The shippers' tie also became important to the preserva-
tion of the conference system later, as well as an aid to
shippers, rather than a device to kill off antagonists. The
former chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission has
expressed this cogently in testimony before a congressional
committee:
We further believe that if the conferences are to be continued
they must have the power to assure themselves the loyalty of
merchants upon whose trade they depend. It is our belief that
the only workable method of achieving such purpose and which
is not at the same time contrary to the American concept of fairness
is the dual-rate system .... We believe that the exclusive patronage
system appropriately regulated to insure fairness between the
shipper or consignee on the one hand, and the carriers on the other,
is the proper instrument. .... 57
Even so, competition is a factor, although not a dominant
one, since it is probably not possible to have an exclusive
57 Testimony of Mr. Stakem, quoted in Hearings Before the Special Sub-
committee on Steamship Conferences of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, supra note 42, at 24.
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patronage contract that does not exclude outside carriers
from the reservoir of cargoes controlled by contract shippers
and to the extent- of the exclusion it will tend to hurt non-
conference carriers. 8
The successful evolution of the exclusive patronage con-
tract practice and of federal legislation protecting the
practice has been accomplished only after a series of court
decisions turning back challenges to its validity. The chal-
lenges prominently supported by the Department of Justice
have brought about, over the years, consistent court support
of the underlying public policy favoring a regulated exclusive
patronage contract system.
In the first of the court challenges, United States Navi-
gation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.," a plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendant steamship lines from using the system of
contracts and rates on the ground that it violated the
Sherman Anti-trust Act and the Clayton Anti-trust Act.
Dismissal of the complaint was affirmed on the ground that
the Shipping Act covers the dominant facts alleged as con-
stituting a violation of the anti-trust laws, particularly
Section 14 of the Act which prohibits retaliation by common
carriers by water against a shipper by resorting to dis-
criminatory or unfair methods. 0 If the practice were illegal
under any circumstances or because of its inherent defects,
as claimed, the dismissal because of the administrative
agency's primary jurisdiction would have been a useless
action and the Court should have passed on the defects
then and there. The Court must have thought more facts
showing bad competitive effects had to be produced before
it could pass judgment. None were shown. The second
challenge came on an appeal from an order of the Secretary
of Commerce enjoining the use of exclusive patronage con-
tract systems in intercoastal trade." As the Secretary
interpreted the evidence before him, the operation of the
58 See Testimony of Mr. James. quoted in Hearings Before the Special
Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of the House Committee on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, supra note 42, at 125.
59284 U.S. 474 (1932).
6od. at 483-84.
61 Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. United States, supra note 53.
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system would not differ substantially from deferred rebates
which were expressly outlawed by Section 14 of the Act
in both foreign and coastwise shipping. The Court stated
in its opinion: "Even though, as appellants seem to argue,
the evidence may lend itself to support a different inference,
we are without authority to substitute our judgment for
that of the Secretary that the discrimination was unreason-
able." 62  Both rebating and unreasonable discrimination
resulting from the way the practice was used, rather than
illegality under any circumstance, were the basis of the
decision, so this case is not authority for the conclusion
that any exclusive patronage contract and two rate system
is unlawful.
The facts in a third challenge 13 showed that the North
Atlantic Continental Freight Conference "sent notices to all
known shippers in the North Atlantic trade that effective
November 1948, the exclusive patronage contract-non-
contract rate system would be inaugurated and that shippers
who refused to enter into contracts to ship with the con-
ference lines exclusively when they could provide trans-
portation were to be charged 20 per cent to 30 per cent
higher than the contract rates." The Board dismissed a
complaint alleging illegality in such action even though
an examiner had found the differential had been arbitrarily
selected. Isbrandtsen, the Attorney General and the Sec-
retary of Agriculture contended, before the district court,
that a dual-rate provision in a conference agreement was,
in all circumstances, invalid under Section 14 of the Act.'
The court's decision stated that "for the purposes of this
decision we assume that, as the Board contends, under some
circumstances the Board may, pursuant to 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 814 (section 14) approve a conference agreement con-
taining such a provision." 65 The court, however, set aside
621d. at 307.63 1sbrandtsen Co. v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference,
3 F.M.B. 235 (1950).64 1sbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
aff'd sub non. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342
U.S. 950 (1952) (per curiam).65 d. at 885-86
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the Board's order and enjoined the conference from using
the dual-rate provision on the ground that the 20 per cent
to 30 per cent differential had been arbitrarily selected.
The rate differential, not the practice, was invalid here.
A fourth challenge came when the federal government,
instead of a shipper, acting by the Attorney General brought
suit against the Far East Conference under the Sherman
Act to enjoin the defendants from using the exclusive
patronage contract system." The fact that the government
and not a shipper was the complainant was held to be
immaterial as long as the Board was the expert agency
responsible for administering the Act, and administrative
remedies dispensed by the Board had to be sought and
pursued to a final conclusion before resort may be had
to the courts." Again the Court refused to hold that the
contract rate system was unlawful under any circumstances.
Up to this point, the law established by these cases was
that: (1) a complaint charging illegality of an exclusive
patronage contract dual-rate system will be dismissed unless
the acts charged have been reviewed by the Commission as
an administrative agency having jurisdiction to administer
the Act; (2) where the use of the system had been found
administratively to operate in a way not differing sub-
stantially from expressly prohibited acts, the courts will not
overrule a finding of illegality; and (3) if the differentials
between rate levels used by a conference in connection with
an exclusive patronage contract system are arbitrarily
selected (i.e., without a study of the needs of the trade),
the practice may be enjoined.
The fifth and last challenge to the practice in Federal
Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co.,6" has left us with a
fourth principle to the effect that a practice of asking dual
rates for exclusive patronage contracts, adopted for the
purpose of curtailing competition, and a practice of using
a contract which contains provisions tying shippers in such
6 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
67 Id. at 576.
68356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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a way as to have the effect of stifling outside competition
must both be held unlawful.
The Department of Justice inferred from roughly the
same background of history that the trade practices and
contracts at the time of the Alexander Committee's in-
vestigations from 1913 to 1916 leading to the enactment of
the Act were not comparable to what now exists. 9 Un-
doubtedly the terms of the contracts have changed over
the years, but the practice of using them is essentially
the same. The historical evidence thus disputed is incon-
clusive as to the extent to which the contracts were used,
and as to whether they were the exception rather than
the rule.
The historical background of dual-rate exclusive
patronage contracts plus congressional action to stop litiga-
tion that would extend the Isbrandtsen decision by in-
validating all exclusive patronage systems, followed by legis-
lation expressly authorizing the Commission to permit use
of exclusive patronage and dual-rate systems, should convince
that the practice is not inherently, or per se, contrary to
the public interest or detrimental to commerce. The re-
porting committee on the new section 14b legislation vouch-
safed this conclusion when it stated that the new law
expressly authorizes "the use of dual-rate systems by con-
ferences, irrespective of the presence or absence of non-
conference competition." 1o The automatic equation between
the practice and retaliation alleged to exist under Section 14
of the Act is not proven and the Department's efforts to
get the courts to use this theorem have failed. Nevertheless,
in the face of (1) the long sustained hostility of the De-
partment and its interpretation of the evidence regarding
early use and the traditional purposes of the practice,
(2) the Isbrandtsen interpretation of the retaliation pro-
visions of section 14 where competition and rate cutting are
proven, and (3) the possibility that the new Commission
may still view dual-rate systems as a competitive measure
6 9 Brief for the United States and the Secretary of Agriculture, p. 37,
Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
70 H.R. REP. No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1961).
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and as a retaliatory action where it coincides in time with
rate cutting, it would take a courageous lawyer to tell
his client that the status of the practice has been settled
favorably to a return to old practices because of the new
legislation. What then can one tell a client? First, before
an exclusive patronage system may be followed, after April
3, 1964,71 an express declaration of permission by the Com-
mission will be essential; second, the permission may be
forthcoming only if the request for permission is sought
when competition by a non-conference operator is present,
and the practice will only be used as a defensive measure.
It is the thesis of this article, however, that the latter
would be an erroneous standard and, if the necessary
competitive measure standard is followed, the courts will
very likely invalidate the use of the contract system because
a defensive measure seems also to be regarded by the courts
as necessarily coercive. The middle or competitive necessity
ground in this case is fraught with danger since the best
defense against a rate war is to render the non-conforming
carrier's competition uneconomic, using the superior coercive
economic power of the conference lines. The true intent
of the latest Isbrandtsen decision seems t9 nullify the excuse
of controlling rate wars or off-setting non-conference com-
petition as a valid purpose for exclusive patrdnage contract
systems. To some extent any response to the activity of
an independent line is retaliation. The new legislation
does not resolve the problem of evaluating competitive
impact.
The most the new legislation does, as far as permitting
the use of contracts that provide lower rates to shippers
who give their patronage to a carrier, is to place the
burden of proving detriments to commerce, contrariety with
public interest, discrimination, unfairness and the like on
persons who oppose the permission. The Isbrandtsen de-
cision, holding arrangements which stifle independent com-
petition retaliatory and thus violative of section 14, is still
the law, and if this is shown in any case the arrangement
would be struck down.
71 75 Stat. 764, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (Supp. IH, J. RF-s. 1961) ; see note 5 supra.
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Steamship conference activity exists in a context of
competition, of course, and a program of requiring shippers
to sign exclusive patronage dual-rate contracts is a vital
part of this activity. As a matter of fact, such a program
is usually initiated with reference to competition by in-
dependent lines when it becomes no longer possible to
quote firm rates from week to week, and rates begin to
change rapidly. The Maritime Commission is charged with
the duty of striking a balance of allowable impact on the
competition of independents. The Commission's job may be
eased because it does not have to prove that the law of the
Isbrandtsen* case is inapplicable in the context of the facts
surrounding any specific application for permission, but a
basic source of difficulty in validating contract systems
under the new law is still with us. These are the conflicting
inferences drawn from certain past practices, or even that
they exist as traditional practices as this article has sought
to establish, and whether in any particular situation in-
dependent competition is being stifled by retaliation and
shippers deprived of a choice of carriers because of the
exclusionary aspects of the contracts' provisions or as the
result of their rigorous damage clauses. The report of the
Anti-trust Subcommittee on March 1, 1962, doubts that the
evidence shows the contracts to be in the public interest:
Upon consideration of all the testimony at our hearings and
upon weighing the detrimental effects of dual-rate contracts on
domestic shippers, importers, independent lines, and upon the
commerce of the United States which, when taken together, are
not insubstantial, against the few benefits said [but not proved]
to be derived from dual-rate agreements, the subcommittee tends
to concur in the privately articulated views of some industry
spokesmen that a factual case for dual rates has not been made.72
This article tries to show there is considerable evidence
that the trade practice need not operate destructively as a
retaliatory competitive measure, although it may be misused
for this purpose, but more evidence of past usage of the
contracts and of their terms is needed for any conclusive
72H.R. REP. No. 56, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 390 (1962).
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judgment about the purposes of conferences in tendering
contracts to shippers and in promulgating two-level tariffs.
A trade practice of long and historical standing should not
be invalidated except on the clearest proof of public injury
and changed circumstances. Detailed historical facts about
the practice and the effects of the exclusion are meagre,
so it might be well to have a moratorium on arguments.
until this course of legal bickering over necessary inferences
is removed by finding out more about the origin, development,
use and effect of the practice. With such information the
courts and the Commission might be able to decide where
the practice stands in relation to the enforcement of the
Act and to our public policy about undue restraints on
competition. Objective tests may also be discovered against
which contract systems can be compared to determine con-
formity with "detrimental to commerce" or "public interest"
standards of section 14b.
The Department of Justice draws inferences from the
fact that in the past the practice was an exception. Other
writers believe the practice can be justified only as a de-
fensive measure. 3 This writer believes it is a valid practice
by virtue of historical acceptance and the burden is on
those who challenge to show invalidity.
The time may be at hand in the international shipping
industry where we must pass from sterile arguments about
whether a practice is necessarily coercive or unlawful per se
because of ill-defined overtones of national policy expressed
in the anti-trust laws, into the real world of actual business
needs in international ocean commerce. The facts of modern
day ocean commerce and long-established international ship-
ping usages should be marshalled to find out just what
kind of freedom is needed before presently undefined statu-
tory standards of public interest can be applied to invalidate
the practices and the implementing contracts used by
carriers.
73 Dodds, Legality of Shipper Tying Arrangements in Ocean Commerce,
23 U. PiTt. L. REv. 933, 949 (1962).
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